In regards to the surveillance technologies that are used on Serbia’s borders - we equally understand the IOM to be an imperial ally of the EU. Having assisted in the furthering of  infrastructural and technological developments of Fortress Europe in Serbian territory.

One way in which the IOM actually procures and supplies these technologies and infrastructure for Serbian border police is through IOM programmes that are funded by the EU or other European countries. 

For example, Denmark recently celebrated the end of a 4-year IOM programme worth 15 million euros, that amongst other objectives provided Serbian border police with training and ‘specific tactical equipment’ - including in March 2025 what was described as ‘the first specialised, multifunctional vehicle - the "Schengen bus" - which will be used primarily for border surveillance’. The so-called ‘Schengen bus’ appears to be a mobile surveillance system equipped with fingerprint scanners.

Between 2016 and 2025, we are aware of various EU-funded IOM programmes in Serbia that have allowed the procurement of technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles or drones, endoscopes and thermal imaging cameras, specialised binoculars, and CCTV-style surveillance within reception centres. This is in addition to physical infrastructure, services, and practical equipment for border authorities.

It has been difficult to accurately assess the total investment from the EU for IOM projects in the Western Balkans, especially considering there are projects we know have specifically supplied surveillance technologies to border authorities but were not listed in IOM's annual financial reports.

Though the project titled: ‘European Union regional support to protection-sensitive migration management systems in the Western Balkans’, which has seen collaboration between Frontex and other border authorities of various Balkan nations - known for their roles in illegal pushbacks - received nearly 11 million euros of funding from the European Commission using IPA money - averaging over 1.2 million euros per year. This project is known to have funded Albania’s progression toward having a biometric database that aligns with EURODAC.

Those not listed include a 2016 project worth 1 million euros - with nearly 400,000 euros specifically earmarked to provide Serbian border police with specialised surveillance equipment. As well as a 2018 project titled ‘EU support to border management phase III’ worth 3 million euros, whose activities included the procurement of specialised border surveillance equipment for Serbian border police on the Bulgarian and North Macedonian borders. Information surrounding the activities of phase I or II of this project is not publicly accessible.

We don’t know the reasons behind the lack of inclusion of certain projects within IOM’s annual financial reports, nor the lack of accessibility to certain phases of projects. However, to us, this certainly further highlights how entrenched the IOM is in Europe's border regime, its associated secrecy mirrored by the likes of Frontex and its collaborators, such as Serbia’s Ministry of Interior. 

Over the years, even non-EU member countries, such as Japan and the US, have funded hundreds of thousands of euros into IOM projects that collaborate with Serbian border police.

Another avenue that highlights the IOM’s significance in enacting border externalisation in Serbia and other Balkan countries is their role as facilitator for EU policing agency activities in Balkan territories. 

The previously mentioned 2024 review document of the 2022 Western Balkan Action Plan shows that the IOM was responsible for implementing projects that enhance the operations of both Frontex and EUROPOL in the Balkan region between 2021 and 2024.

The Frontex project, worth 5 million euros, broadly aims to enhance operations as well as existing status agreements with Western Balkan countries. Specifically within the timeline of the action, it is stated “[to] provide [Western Balkan] WB partners with technical, operational and other kinds of relevant support” as well as “[to] provide necessary personnel and resources to ensure the availability of EU assets, notably in Frontex joint operations” . These statements, though difficult to prove or disprove due to the lack of transparency in Frontex agreements with third countries, likely include reference to the use of surveillance technologies we know have been used to facilitate pushbacks across Western Balkan borders.

The EUROPOL project, this time worth 2 million euros, states its aim to “Make full use of the newly established EUROPOL Operational Task Force”. This project can be understood to follow on from the 2023 EUROPOL regulation reform, which essentially proposed a significant expansion of EUROPOL powers, especially when it comes to its digital surveillance capabilities against people on the move. What this looks like in the case of Western Balkan countries is the exchange of staff and field missions, and in turn, the implementation of EU-funded projects.

Investment in EUROPOL’s biometric systems and their capacity to collect and process biometric data on mass are key aspects of the reform. Considering Serbia’s database compatibility with the EURODAC system and the lack of transparency of EUROPOL field missions, there is serious cause for concern regarding EUROPOL’s ability to collect the biometric data of people on the move in Serbia or other Balkan countries under the guise of policing interventions.

Mass fingerprinting actions have already occurred on Serbia’s borders with the EU. In October 2023, a joint action between INTERPOL and the Serbian Ministry of Interior reported the fingerprinting of 516 people from within state reception facilities as well as at ‘wild’ locations near the border with Hungary.

Serbia is again not the only country whose border personnel have received technologies directly via EU-funded IOM programmes. The likes of Bosnia & Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania have also received tech in this way. 

Millions and millions of euros of EU taxpayer money have been pushed through the IOM to facilitate the extension of Fortress Europe into Western Balkan territories.

By platforming EU-funded programmes as an additional mechanism that equips borders and border police with infrastructure and equipment, the IOM are directly complicit, if not actively facilitating the pushbacks and further violations of human rights we know are both carried out by Western Balkan border personnel, and are at times facilitated by the surveillance technologies they have access to.

You will now listen to an extract of a testimony from January 2024. The account highlights the experiences of an individual pushed back from Serbia to Bulgaria. As you listen to this person's account, keep in mind this quote from the IOM’s mission statement, whilst they simultaneously bolster the capabilities of the Serbian border police.

“The Organization is guided by the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including upholding human rights for all. Respect for the rights, dignity and well-being of migrants remains paramount.”

“The respondent, a male adult from Morocco, was walking on a highway from Belo Polje in Serbia to Pirot. He was together with a friend. About 2 km from Pirot, he described that several cars, recognized as police vehicles, arrived transporting four individuals wearing uniforms that resemble those of police officers. According to the respondent, the uniforms that the officers were wearing were completely black and they wore ski masks where only their eyes were shown. The officers forced the respondent and his friend into the same car and drove for about an hour. The car had tinted windows, so they couldn’t see where they were going. Ultimately they were brought to the border close to Bogoyna where they were forced out of the vehicle. It was close to a river. The police took the clothes, shoes and other belongings from them and smashed their phones. After that, the officers beat the respondent and his friend severely. He described this as (quote) ‘’it was as if they were beating animals.’’ (unquote). The two were hit and kicked for what felt like fifteen minutes. The officers sprayed pepper spray into the eyes of the respondent. Almost two weeks later, his foot was still swollen and legs still bruised as a result of the beating. The officers proceeded to then  force both the men into the river. Afterwards they had to spend the night in the forest in Bulgaria.”

This account is typical of the levels of violence often enacted by Serbian authorities during pushbacks.

Though mobile surveillance systems are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of the range of surveillance tech OPTIX advertises on their website. In fact, they have a specific page dedicated to ‘solutions for border control’ offering various levels of large-scale technical systems for border surveillance at both land and sea borders.

Their ‘level 3’ system for land borders lists Mobile surveillance systems, Detention task force unit equipment, Sensor lines, Surveillance towers, Local Command centers, and Command center headquarters as part of the package. 

An accompanying promotional video published back in 2021 states that OPTIX have implemented 9 border surveillance projects throughout the world already.

However, the offering of large-scale technical solutions for border management is not unusual within the market. Other large tech companies design and advertise similar border management solution packages.

Elbit Systems, for example. Well known for their legacy in facilitating and profiting from decades of illegal occupation and, more recently, the ongoing genocide in Gaza. The Israeli military technology manufacturer similarly offers their own integrated border solutions for both land and sea. 

Plus, Elbit are no stranger to collaborating with the EU in the realms of border management. Back in 2020, along with Airbus and Israel Aerospace Industries, they were one of the recipients of 50 million euros worth of border surveillance drone contracts given out by Frontex.

In terms of the stakeholders and profiteers, the actual technologies being used and the ideologies that support such practices, there is certainly an intersection between the imperial practices exercised at borders in Europe and the Western-backed Genocidal ‘war’ in Gaza.

For instance, DJI, the Chinese-manufactured drones, known to be in the possession of Serbia’s border police as well as having been seen first-hand at the Hungarian border, are also known to be in possession of the IDF.  As well as recent reports stating that the Israeli military is retrofitting commercial drones - including DJI models - so that they can be weaponised against Palestinians in Gaza.

Another example of this intersection was the recent pilot project led by Frontex & the Bulgarian border police that was mentioned in the previous episode. The pilot was testing out the first tactical drone surveillance system at the Bulgarian / Turkish border. A border - also discussed previously -  that is synonymous with violent pushbacks of people on the move.

As mentioned, a key partner in the pilot project was Shield AI. 

Shield AI is a US-based military tech manufacturer that developed the Nova 2 drone model that is currently being used by the IDF as part of the Genocide in Gaza. The Nova 2 is an AI-enabled small drone which has the ability to autonomously navigate and map complex subterranean or multi-story buildings without GPS, communications, or a human pilot. It was confirmed by the co-founder of Shield AI that the Nova 2 model could be customised for weaponisation.

Additionally, Shield AI have advertised its deep strategic partnership with Palantir. The large US data & security company who have been foundational to how Israel has conducted the Genocide in Gaza, as well as the 2025 Trump-orchestrated mass deportations by ICE.

The Bulgarian border-based pilot project itself concluded in July 2025. The surveillance system being tested was described by Frontex as follows:

“The mobile surveillance system integrated multiple data sources—including drone footage, infrared and daylight cameras, and inputs from smaller tactical drones—into a single operational picture using GIS tools. This allowed for real-time situational awareness to be shared securely with teams wherever needed.” 

This 2025 pilot project is emblematic of what we understand a border industrial complex to look like in Europe. Headed by Frontex, the EU’s border guards, testing out new cutting-edge technologies on Europe's borders against people on the move. Awarding contracts to the likes of DAT CON - the Slovenian company who have sold their surveillance system services to the EU for millions of euros to be used by non-EU members Serbia & Albania, as well Shield AI - a company who have developed and sold technologies that are used by militaries across the world as well as having their high tech solutions used to enact an ongoing genocide. All of which were funded by the European taxpayer.

It is a conglomeration of an EU agency, a European company who have already made millions supporting Fortress Europe, and developing relationships with an international high-tech company that profits from and supports violence globally, which we understand to be quite representative of the border industrial complex in Europe as it stands. 

On the Serbian side, the areas we chose to visit are declared as areas for the construction of new, similar, fixed surveillance systems as a result of the previously discussed 2024 EU-funded tender won by DAT CON. 

The forests surrounding the Serbian town of Dmitrovgrad - not many kilometres from the sites we visited - are well known as both a popular irregular crossing point from Bulgaria to Serbia and an area in which violent pushbacks are regularly carried out by Serbian authorities. 

The landscape shows this. 

We saw many discarded and ripped-up ID cards from the registration of Bulgarian reception centres. As well as old clothes and shoes - either discarded after enduring the lengthy and challenging walk through this landscape, or possibly the result of forced undressings imposed by border police. 

The forced undressing of people on the move is not uncommon as a tactic used by border personnel to inflict further violence within already illegal pushbacks. 

For instance, in February 2024, footage of a pushback from Serbia to North Macedonia showed over a dozen people who had been stripped and forced to walk back across into North Macedonian territory during freezing winter temperatures. This was actually a rare instance when issues of border violence along the Balkan migration routes got picked up by mainstream news outlets in Western Europe - for example, The Guardian ran this story.

Returning to the border with Bulgaria. Pushback testimonies from those who were forced back across the border - around the town of Dimitrovgrad - are characterised by vehicles. By this I mean that many of the initial apprehensions described in the testimonies occur by Serbian police officers within vehicles on a paved road, who then proceed to take people to a point closer to the border itself and force them to walk back - often inflicting violence along the way. 

Just as you would have heard in the previous testimony extract.

There is a specific road identified in testimonies. This road is the 429 running almost parallel to the Bulgarian border, on average, only a few hundred metres into Serbian territory. During our visit, we drove down the 429 as much as the surface allowed. The road itself was relatively newly paved for roughly 10 km from Dimitrovgrad heading southwest until the landscape became significantly more rocky and jagged - and seemingly impossible to navigate by foot. At this point, the road paving ceased. 

The purpose of this paved section of the 429 seems to be to facilitate border patrols by vehicle and, in turn, pushbacks. Likely, it had been paved for this reason alone. It seems that using this newly paved road, regular police patrols facilitated by the surveillance of drones that have been reported to fly over this border, plus the soon-to-be-constructed fixed surveillance system, is at least in part the system of tech-facilitated surveillance in this particular stretch of border. 

It’s worth noting that during our trip, this stretch of road was patrolled by both Serbian and Frontex police vehicles, even during the day, whilst most border crossing attempts happen at night.

During a trip to the border with North Macedonia, we visited a section of border near the town of Presevo - home to the largest currently active reception centre in Serbia with a capacity of 640.

Geographically, this section of the border exhibits a rare flat valley bottom between the Sar mountains to the West and the Kozjak mountains to the East - created by a glacier around 20,000 years ago. 

Now, the flat base of this glacial valley provides a scarce break in the mountainous landscape that runs along all of Serbia’s southern borders. As a result, this area has been used as a crossing point into Serbia with fluctuating popularity over the years. 

Consequently, a short run of border fence stretching 6km as the crow flies has been built by Serbian authorities along this relatively flat stretch of border.

The idea of border infrastructure as well as surveillance technologies being largely symbolic, is significant when we look at the role surveillance tech has as a deterrent.

For example, the 2023 special operation that was carried out on the Serbian-Hungarian border was highly militarised and technical - with authorities reported to have mobilised both drones and helicopters to facilitate the eviction processes of informal living sites. In response to the operation, patterns of migration through Serbia and toward the EU were altered. Routes from Serbia toward Bosnia, then onto Croatia became more popular. With the most popular crossing area surrounding the city of Loznica. The landscape here is characterised by steep mountainous terrain, with the Drina river forming the natural border between the two states, crossed by those attempting to seek sanctuary in the EU.

The Drina is unpredictable, with strong currents and severe winter temperatures. From the data available, between 2016 and 2025, the border between Serbia and Bosnia has claimed at least 101 lives, making it the most deadly of Serbia’s borders. 98 of those who have been killed by this border were found to have drowned. 

When we compare the characteristics of Serbia’s borders with Bosnia in the West, opposed to Hungary in the North, we can see that despite the varying nature of both borders, a deterrent factor remains crucial to how border management is executed at each place. 

For example, on the one hand, the Serbian-Bosnian border is naturally geographically treacherous and as a result deadly. With any implemented border infrastructure being mostly analogue in the form of watchtowers, which are few and far between, and with little known or reported use of surveillance tech. Plus, although pushbacks do occur from Bosnia to Serbia, in comparison to some of Serbia’s other borders, relatively few are reported. 

On the other hand, as discussed, the Serbian-Hungarian border is highly infrastructured with regularly reported use of surveillance tech such as drone flights, as well as being known to be a so-called ‘pushback hotspot’ along the Balkan migration route. 

Factors of deterrence are a universal trait of border management strategies that oppose people's freedom to move.  

At the border with Bosnia, this deterrence is present naturally through the treacherous geography within the landscape, and as a result, less tech and infrastructure is necessary, and direct police violence is less widespread as an alternative force of deterrence.

Whereas at the border with Hungary, where the landscape is more enabling of movement, artificial deterrent measures are required to meet the requirements of a ‘border management strategy’. Here, deterrents take the form of militarisation. The border is highly infrastructured, technical, and characterised by violent pushbacks. Pushbacks are already understood to be the EU’s de facto deterrence against movement across borders. 

On Serbia’s borders, it is clear that surveillance technologies, which are significantly funded by the EU, are increasingly forming part of the deterrent factor within the European border regime that is exhibited here. 

Though what is alike in both natural and artificial modes of deterrence is that when strategised within border management, they share the modus operandi of subjecting people on the move to violence. 

In the case of Serbia, this means risking life in dangerous geographies to avoid apprehension or risking the body at the hands of tech and infrastructure that facilitate direct police violence.

In both cases, this is EU-funded state violence.

SHOWNOTES 

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